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Cobb: Bastard or Legitimate Child of Furman - An Analysis of Wyoming's

COMMENT
BASTARD OR LEGITIMATE CHILD OF FURMAN?
AN ANALYSIS OF WYOMING'S NEW
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW
My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
And every tongue brings in a several tale,
And every tale condemns me for a villain.
Perjury, perjury, in the highest degree,

Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree,
All several sins, all used in each degree,

Throng to the bar, crying all, 'Guilty! guilty!'
I shall despair. There is no creature loves me;

And if I die, no soul will pity me.

-Shakespeare,

The Tragedy of

King Richard the Third, V, iii.

INTRODUCTION
There is probably no facet of criminal law, and certainly
no facet of penology, that attracts as much emotionalism as
the death penalty. And understandably so, for whether or
not a state should have the power to kill a human being, however base and criminal his acts, is one of the mightiest issues
of our time.
This comment, however, is not designed to discuss the
pros and cons of capital punishment. Nor is it aimed at a
conclusion as to which side of the issue is the "right" one.
But in order to provide the framework for an analysis of
Wyoming's new capital punishment law, and to begin groping
toward answers to the relevant questions (Where are we now?
Where do we go from here ?), it is necessary to be aware of
some of the emotions that cloud the death penalty issue. For
these emotions have set the stage for the confusion that prevails today, confusion that led to nine separate opinions in
Furman, and confusion that followed Furman, as the states
struggled to find their own answers to the ambivalent decision.
Proponents of the death penalty maintain that it is essential for purposes of deterrence and retribution, among
other things, and to rid society of such mass murderers as
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1974

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 9 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 11

210

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. IX

Richard Speck and Adolf Eichmann.' Abolitionists respond
that retribution is not a legitimate goal of criminal justice,
and that the death penalty does not deter, pointing to such
examples as the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and
Martin Luther King in death penalty states.2
Both sides are using emotionalism to persuade. Eichmann and Speck are true monsters of modern civilization,
but would killing them really improve our world, avenge their
victims, or serve justice any more than would imprisoning
them for life? And should their monstrosity be put around
the necks of more human murderers? On the other hand, does
the fact that two assassins were not deterred by the death
penalty necessarily mean that no one will be deterred? Does
the impotence of revenge make the punishment worthless?
There are no cold, hard answers to such questions. The
United States Supreme Court, in Furman,' held discretionary
imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional, but only
two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, held the death penalty
itself unconstitutional. Two others, Burger and Blackmun
(dissenting), defended discretion as vital to a requisite flexibility in the sentencing process, and defended the right of
legislatures to establish the death penalty, at the same time
observing that they were personally opposed to it and would
vote against it if they were legislators.
Some states had abolished capital punishment even before Furman,and, whatever "side" one may happen to be on,
certainly from the standpoint of simplicity of administration
of criminal justice, a statute like Maine's is to be envied:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder, and
1. See Vance, The Death Penalty After Furman, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW 850
(1973).
2. See Meltsner, Litigating Against the- Death Penalty : The Strategy Behind
Furman, 82 YALE L.J. 1111, 1117 (1973). Meltsner says:
"Both murders took place in death penalty states, committed by
If some dreamed of remen who were obviously undeterred ....
venge, the impotence of such feelings to bring back men who were
loved for their presence or the hopes they evoked reinforced the
disgust with which the lawyers contemplated the prospect of more
legal death."
92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972). See Part II infra,
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S -......
for a discussion of the decision and each Justice's opinion.
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shall be punished by imprisonment for life. ' 4 But other
states, including Wyoming, thought the death penalty important enough to warrant complex new post-Furman statutes.'
And so the lines are drawn for what one commentator called
"the profound issue of controversy in the 1970's. '
Both sides of the capital punishment issue reach the ultimate irresolution in the haunting words of Mr. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Furman:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating
agony of the spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of
my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for
the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical
distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by
finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief
that capital punishment serves no useful purpose
that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's training and life's experiences and is not
compatible with the philosophical convictions I have
been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense
of 'reverence for life.' Were I a legislator, I would
vote against the death penalty. ...'
But Blackmun is not a legislator, and he refuses to call the
death penalty a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Perhaps never
before in all our history has a Supreme Court Justice so
embraced the spirit and philosophy of the majority while
aligning himself with the dissent, and thus so encapsulated the
problems inherent in the subject of capital punishment.
This paper will examine, in Part I, the nine opinions in
Furman and the possible effects of Furman in the future,
some reactions of commentators to Furman in Part II, and
some reactions of legislatures to Furman in Part III. Part
IV will attempt to bring all of this information together in
the rendering of an in-depth analysis of Wyoming's new capital punishment law.
I. FURMAN V. GEORGIA
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in Furman v.
Georgia,struck down as unconstitutional most state and fed4.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2651 (1964).

6.

Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, 35 FED. PROATION 32, 40 (1971).

5. See Parts III and IV infra.

7. Furman v. Georgia, supra note 3, at 2812 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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eral statutes that prescribed the death penalty, by holding
the Texas and Georgia statutes unconstitutional.8 Each Justice wrote a separate opinion, and no member of the majority
participated in the opinion of any other member. Thus Furman,, in a sense, both creates and exemplifies the confusion
surrounding the capital punishment issue. In telling the
states what they definitely could not do (sentence defendants
to death at the jury's discretion and without legislative standards) ,' the decision failed to tell them what they could do, if
anything. The result is "a flurry of activity on state and
federal levels to reinstate capital punishment to whatever
degree possible." 1 But what degree is possible ? It is necessary to briefly examine the essential points made by each
Justice.
A. The Opinions
Mr. Justice Douglas speaks primarily in terms of violation of equal protection by arbitrary enforcement."lHe does
not go so far as to hold capital punishment unconstitutional
per se. Rather, he says "the exaction of the death penalty does
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 2 (emphasis added.) By "exaction" Douglas apparently means "a
system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether
defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned."' 8 The key phrase here is "uncontrolled discretion,"
and some states,"4 including Wyoming," have responded with
"controls" which establish mandatory death sentences for
specified crimes. But, it should be noted, Douglas also observes that:
Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may
be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
Such conceivably might be the fate of a mandatory
death penalty. . . . Whether a mandatory death
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Furman, at 2727.
Id.
22 CATH. U.L. REV. 651, 664 (1973).
Furman, supra note 3, at 2728 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2727.
Id. at 2784.
See Part III infra.
See Part IV infra.
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penalty would otherwise be constitutional is a question I do not reach.1"
Mr. Justice Brennan, unlike Douglas, holds the death
penalty unconstitutional per se: "When examined by the
principles applicable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to
human dignity. The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel
and unusual' and the States may no longer inflict it as a
punishment for crimes."'7 Brennan points out that "a punishment is 'cruel and unusual' . . . if it does not comport with
human dignity.'"" He says death sentences" treat members of
the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and
discarded."' 9 He finds death "an unusually severe punish2
ment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. "-°
Two of Brennan's strongest arguments weaken any defense of capital punishment on the basis of either deterrence
or avenging of community moral outrage. As to deterrence,
Brennan says:
the argument can only apply to those who think rationally about the commission of capital crimes.
Particularly is that true when the potential criminal
... must not only consider the risk of punishment,
but also distinguish between two possible punishments. The concern, then, is with a particular type
of potential criminal, the rational person who will
commit a capital crime knowing that the punishment
is long-term imprisonment . . .but will not commit
the crime knowing that the punishment is death....
[T]he assumption that such persons exist is implausible.2 1
As to avenging community moral outrage, Brennan reasons,
"if the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect
to lower our respect for life and
at all, it more likely tends
22
values."
our
brutalize
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Furman, supra note 3, at 2735-36 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2760 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 2742.
Id. at 2743.
Id. at 2751.
Id. at 2758.
Id. at 2759.
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Mr. Justice Stewart's holding is "that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."" 3
Stewart expresses strong dislike for the death penalty: "It is
unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection
of rehabilitation . . . as a basic purpose of criminal justice.
And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all
that is embodied in our concept of humanity." 2 4 But he finds
it "unnecessary to reach the ultimate question" 2 5 whether "infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible
in all circumstances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, "" although he admits that the case presented by Brennan and Marshall "is a strong one."
Mr. Justice White also refuses to reach the question of
per se unconstitutionality of the death penalty, but he seems
to be leaning in the opposite direction from Stewart: "I do
not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional
per se or that there is no system of capital punishment that
would comport with the Eighth Amendment."2 White explains that the constitutional problem, as he sees it, arises
from (1) legislative authorization of the death penalty, followed by (2) standardless delegation of discretion, as to when
to impose the death penalty, to judges or juries, and (3) the
infrequency with which the death penalty is actually imposed.29 Despite the overall harshness of White's opinion,
he concedes "it is difficult to prove as a general proposition
that capital punishment, however administered, more effectively serves the ends of the criminal law than does imprisonment. "°
Mr. Justice Marshall, like Brennan, finds capital punishment unconstitutional per se:
[T]he death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary
punishment which violates the Eighth Amendment.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 2763 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 2760.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2763 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2764.
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.. The point has now been reached at which deference to the legislatures is tantamount to abdication
of our judicial roles as fact finders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution. . . . There is no
rational basis for concluding that capital punishment
is not excessive. It therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment."

Marshall says "I[t]here are six purposes conceivably served
by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention
of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and
confessions, eugenics, and economy."" In disposing of these,
Marshall's best argument is against the concept of retribution: "At times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence society's abhorrence of the act. But the
Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves.
The cruel and unusual language limits the avenues through
which vengeance can be channeled." 3
As to prevention of recidivism, Marshall says "it is critical to note that the jury is never asked to determine whether
He adds that, if
[defendants] are likely to be recidivists."
the death penalty is to be retained, "[o]n the one hand, due
process would seem to require that we have some procedure
to demonstrate incurability before execution; and, on the
other hand, equal protection would then seemingly require
that all incurables be executed. . . ."" He decides that the
only "conclusion that can be drawn from all of this" isthat
the death penalty is unconstitutional."
The dissenting Justices are little fonder of the death
penalty than the majority. But they agree that setting penalties is a legislative function with which the Supreme Court
should seldom interfere. Burger, Blackmun, and Powell all
indicate that they would prefer abolition of capital punishment but they feel constitutionally compelled to maintain a
hands-off policy.
S1.
32.
33.
34.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

2787 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2779.
2780.
2785.
2786.
2787.
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Mr. Chief Justice Burger says, "If we were possessed of
legislative power, I would either join with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall or, at the very least, restrict the
use of capital punishment to a small category of the most
heinous crimes." 7 But he feels that "the primacy of the
legislative role narrowly defines the scope of judicial inThe Chief Justice is particularly distressed by
quiry. '"
White's approach:
This application of the words of the Eighth Amendment suggests that capital punishment can be made
to satisfy Eighth Amendment values if its rate of
imposition is somehow multiplied; it seemingly follows that the flexible sentencing system created by
the legislatures and carried out by juries and judges,
has yielded more mercy than the Eighth Amendment
can stand. The implications of this approach are
mildly ironical. 9
Burger realized that the states would respond to Furman by
establishing mandatory death sentences. He addressed this
problem in advance, by expressing his disapproval of mandatory sentencing, and in doing so, he sets some minimum standards as guidelines for the legislatures. He says mandatory
death sentences should not be provided "in such a way as to
deny juries the opportunity to bring in a verdict on a lesser
charge; under such a system, the death penalty could only be
avoided by a verdict of acquittal. If this is the only alternative... I would have preferred that the Court opt for total
abolition." 4 0 He also complains that "[n] ow, after the long
process of drawing away from blind imposition of uniform
sentences for every person convicted of a particular offense,"
we seem to be turning back in that direction, and so threatening "the progress of penal reform.""1
It seems clear, then, that any statute which provides for
a mandatory death sentence, but does not allow a lesser included offense instruction or some process for a consideration
of mitigating circumstances (to prevent "the blind imposi37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

2797 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
2801.
2808.
2810.
2810-11.
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tion of uniform sentences") will be unlikely to receive Burger's support.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's feelings about the death penalty
were quoted in the introduction. 42 He, too, is worried about
the reaction of the states to Furman:
[T]he result, I fear, will be that statutes stricken
down today will be reenacted by state legislatures to
prescribe the death penalty for specified crimes
without any alternative for the imposition of a lesser
punishment in the discretion of the judge or jury....
This approach . ..encourages legislation that is regressive and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the
element of mercy in the imposition of punishment. I
thought we had passed beyond that point in our
criminology long ago."3
Due to Blackmun's intense personal opposition to the death
penalty in any form, and his expressed fears that a mandatory death penalty will effectively remove what little mercy
there may have been left in the old discretionary system, he
is almost certain to refuse to support any capital punishment
law that totally "eliminates the element of mercy."
Mr. Justice Powell feels that "legislative judgments as
to the efficacy of particular punishments are presumptively
rational and may not be struck down under the Eighth Amendment because this Court may think that some alternate sanction would be more appropriate."" He expresses his agreement with the report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which he helped
to write, and which said that the death penalty "clearly has
an undesirable impact on the administration of criminal justice. "" But he insists that this is not a decision that "could
or should be made by the judicial branch." 4
Mr. Justice Rehnquist agrees with the reasoning relied
on by the other dissenters, and concludes "that this decision
42.
43.
44.
45.

See INTRODUCTION supra.
Furman, supra note 3, at 2816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2837 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2841 n.63. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967)
(chaired by Nicholas Katzenbach, then Attorney General of the United
States).
46. Id. at 2841.
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holding unconstitutional capital punishment is not an act of
judgment, but rather an act of will. 4 7
B. The Future Effect of Furman
It is obvious that the new post-Furman death penalty
statutes enacted by Wyoming" and other states49 will not be
upheld by either Mr. Justice Brennan or Mr. Justice Marshall,
both of whom have held the death penalty unconstitutional
per se. The states must look for support in the future from a
majority of different membership than that in Furman. If
the states assume that mandatory statutes will be easily upheld by the four dissenters in Furman and one Justice, or
more, from the Furman majority, they are probably mistaken. The sharp division between the White approach and
the Burger-Blackmun approach should not be overlooked."
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to draft a statute
that would meet the approval of both White, on the one hand,
and Burger and Blackmun, on the other.
Powell and Rehnquist can be expected to support any
reasonable statute, since their language is very strong in favor
of the presumptive validity of legislative action with respect
to setting penalties. Apart from abolishing capital punishment, then, or limiting it to one or two of the most heinous
crimes, such as murder by a life-sentence convict, the states
were left with two logical alternatives after Furman: (1)
They could draft a statute in conjunction with White's approach, hoping that Douglas, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist would form a majority in support of such a statute; or
(2) they could draft an essentially mandatory death penalty
statute, but one which allows a lesser included offense instruction, hoping for a majority of support from Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Douglas or Stewart.
Which course of action is preferable ? Neither seems entirely satisfactory, and both must rely on a strange coalition
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Part IV infra.
See Part III infra.
A lesser included offense instruction, demanded by Burger and Blackmun,
is obviously inconsistent with the removal of jury discretion, demanded by
White. In addition, Burger and Blackmun want some flexibility to remain
in the sentencing process, while White wants the death sentence to be inflexible and pre-established.
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of Justices. A major unknown factor in both alternatives is
how Stewart and Douglas will be likely to vote in the future.1
It is uncertain whether either Justice would ultimately decide
in favor of a mandatory death penalty statute. Douglas is
careful to say, in Furman, that he will not support a mandatory death penalty which might be capable of discriminatory
administration.2 Stewart is equally careful to say that he
thinks Brennan and Marshall present a strong case for per se
unconstitutionality of the death penalty.53 These are the
only hints given by Stewart and Douglas with respect to potential future death penalty cases, and they hold little promise
for those states which desire to retain capital punishment.
If, however, a state is determined to at least make the
attempt to enact a constitutional death penalty statute, it is
submitted that the preferable alternative is to incorporate the
Burger-Blackmun criteria. A statute designed to please White
must have the support of both Stewart and Douglas, while
one designed to please Burger and Blackmun will need the
support of Stewart or Douglas. Obviously, to get the support
of one of the two cannot be as difficult a task as getting the
support of both would be. But it is still a very difficult task,
and only the most carefully drawn statute has even the
slightest chance of success. For example, a simple provision
in the statute allowing the giving of a lesser included offense
instruction would satisfy Burger; but in order to satisfy
Douglas, who is worried about discriminatory enforcement,
there would have to be, at very least, an additional provision
that such instruction must be given uniformly in every case
in which it is conceivably warranted by the evidence. And
even this would not be enough for Douglas, if juries take advantage of the instruction to find the more appealing defendants guilty of the lesser offense, while finding the less appealing defendants guilty of the capital crime. Thus the
statute would also have to provide an automatic, impartial re51. White, like Stewart and Douglas, states that he does not reach the issue
of per se unconstitutionality of the death penalty. However, since White
is the majority Justice who most meticulously spells out what he considers
to be wrong with the old statutes, presumably he will feel compelled to
support a statute that has been careiully devised to overcome his specific
objections.
52. See discussion of Douglas' opinion in Part I, A.
53. See discussion of Stewart's opinion in Part I, A.
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view of both the giving of the instruction (or failure to give
it) and the jury's use of the instruction.
Similarly, the flexibility which Burger wants, to prevent
"the blind imposition of uniform sentences" could result in
the arbitrary enforcement which Douglas fears, particularly
if it is provided at the trial stage of the proceedings. Both
Justices may be willing to go along with a statute which removes all flexibility at the trial level (with the unavoidable exception of trier of fact discretion to determine whether
or not the offense falls within the statutory definition of capital murder) and reinstalls some flexibility at the appellate
level, complete with statutory guidelines which the appellate
court must follow to the letter in every case. This would give
the appellate court a certain degree of discretion, but only
within the statutorily established limits-it would provide
the control that Douglas seems to demand when he complains
about "uncontrolled discretion." Of course, the legislative
standards would have to be very narrow and unambiguous, in
order to hold this discretion to an absolute minimum.
As one commentator observed:
Whether or not the Supreme Court will approve
mandatory death penalties remains to be seen. However, no Justice presently sitting on the Court has
stated that he would do so. Those who did speculate
on the matter in Furman v. Georgia either inferred
that they would not, or categorically stated they would
oppose the death penalty under any circumstances. 4
The one thing that is clear after Furman is that reviving
capital punishment may be an insurmountable difficulty.
For those states which find it worth the effort, the utmost
care must be taken in writing the statute-anything less is
certain to end in defeat.
II.

REACTIONS OF COMMENTATORS TO FURMAN

Those commentators who have written articles on the
status of the death penalty after Furman seem to agree that
the decision created more confusion than it resolved. Polsby,
54. McDonald, Capital Punishment in South Carolina: The End of an Era,
24 S.C.L. Rzv. 762, 771 (1972).
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writing for the Supreme Court Review, said, "The long-term
impact of Furman may be limited,"" and found the decision
"of dubious value as a precedent when, for example, a state
decides to enact a compulsory death penalty for first degree
murder or rape or kidnapping.""
Most of the commentators, after examining Furman, decided that the decision puts an end to our history of capital
punishment. Junker said: "My hunch is that Furman spells
the complete end of capital punishment in this country, not
because its logic requires it, but because the moral authority
of the Court will command it.""7
McDonald argued for the futility of passing mandatory
death penalty statutes:
As long as the grand jury has the prerogative to indict or not to indict, the prosecutor the authority
to determine when, how and what to prosecute, the
jury the right to convict or acquit and the governor
the power to grant or withhold clemency, the death
penalty remains part of a discretionary sentencing
structure."
He concluded, "the time has now come for the state frankly to
acknowledge that the death penalty has been relegated to our
history. '"

The legal staff of the Governor's Committee to Study
Capital Punishment in Florida,0 agreed with McDonald.
They observed: "Now that the Court's role has been established by the Furman precedent, some or all of the four dissenters in Furman are likely to consider the question on its
merits, and some or all of these Justices are likely to vote for
abolition of capital punishment. .. . ' They also pointed out

that "Justices Douglas, Stewart and White may,.. in future
cases, be prepared to vote against capital punishment, regard.

55. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, SuP. CT.
REV. 1972: 1, 40 (1972).
56. Id. at 40.
57. Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. L.
REV. 95, 109 (1972).
58. Supra note 54, at 768-69.
59. Id. at 794.
60. The Committee legal staff consisted of law professors Ehrhardt, Hubbart,
Levinson, Smiley, and Wills.
61. Ehrhardt et. aL, The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Experience,
64 J. CraM. L. & C. 2, 3 (1973).
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less of the system under which it may be administered.... "6 2
They, too, noted "other areas of unfettered discretion," including executive clemency, jury discretion to convict on a
lesser offense charge, and plea bargaining to lesser offenses:
Since these areas of discretion would remain intact
under a system which eliminated jury discretion to
recommend mercy, it is highly unlikely that such a
system would reduce the risk of arbitrariness sufficiently to satisfy the basic constitutional objections
of Justices Stewart and White. Furthermore, any
effort to eliminate these critical areas of discretion
would fortify the position of the four dissenting Justices in Furman who observed that such a system
would be so regressive as to be unconstitutional, making total abolition the only alternative."
The Committee legal staff concluded that, "while Furman on
its face appears to leave the door open to the enactment of
valid capital punishment statutes, the decision strongly implies that capital punishment in the United States is a thing
of the past.""
III. REACTIONS OF LEGISLATURES TO FURMAN
Despite the advice of the Florida committee legal staff,
the Florida legislature enacted a new death penalty statute,"'
which Professors Ehrhardt and Levinson criticized as "An
Exercise in Futility. "" McDonald agreed:

The new Florida death law and its provisions for
separate trial as to sentence, findings of fact by the
court based upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case in which death is imposed, and
automatic review by the Supreme Court marks an attempt to make sentencing visible and rational. It
does not, however, avoid what was condemned in
Furmanv. Georgia-discretion and the arbitrariness
which inevitably flows from it.6"
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 and § 921.141 (1972). The latter section sets
forth Florida's procedure for imposition of the death penalty.
66. Ehrhardt and Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An
Exercise in Futility? 64 J. CRiM. L. & C. 2, 3 (1973).
67. Supra note 54, at 768.
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Of those state legislatures that have responded to Furman, 8 the great majority have responded by enacting new
death penalty statutes." The scope of this comment does not
permit an analysis of each of the new death penalty statutes.
The statutes of Arizona and Utah will be discussed as two
variations on the most common type of statute,"0 and Ohio's
statute will be discussed as the best version of this type of
statute. The Oklahoma statute will be discussed separately,
and Wyoming's statute will be anayzed in Part IV.
A. The Statutes of Arizona, Utah, and Ohio
Arizona's procedure for imposing capital punishment7
provides for a separate sentencing hearing before the trial
judge alone to determine whether any of the statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist. Arizona enumerates
six aggravating and four mitigating circumstances:
Aggravating-(1) prior conviction of a life imprisonment or
death penalty felony, (2) prior conviction of a violent felony,
(3) knowing creation of a "grave risk of death to others in
addition to the victim," (4) procurement of the murder by
payment, (5) commission of the murder for gain, (6) commission of the murder "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
2

manner."
68.

69.
70.

71.
72.

7

New death penalty statutes were enacted by Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-452 to 54 (Supp. 1972-73);
For California, see The Denver Post, Sept. 9, 1973; Pub. L. No. 73-137,
§§ 1 to 4 [Jan. 1973] CONN. SEss. LAWS 184; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209
(Supp. 1972); ILL. UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS §§ 1005-2-3 to 1005-5-3
(1972); IND. ACTS 1973, Pub. L. No. 328, § 1 (1973); N. Y. PENAL LAW,
§ 125.30 (McKinney Supp. 1972); OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2903.01, §§ 2929.02
to .04 (1974); ch. 167, §§ 1-6 [1973] OKLA. SESS. LAWS 240; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202, §§ 76-3-206-207 (Supp. 1973) ; WYO. STAT. § 6-54 (Supp.
1973). The North Carolina supreme court reinstated the death penalty for
certain crimes in State v. Waddell, 41 U.S.L.W. 2398 (N.C. 1973). The
New Jersey Supreme Court abolished the death penalty in State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1972). Colorado's death penalty statute appears to
be inoperative, as attempted corrective legislation was defeated. Letter from
Earl E. Thaxton, Senior Analyst, Colorado Legislative Council, to Lynn
Cobb, Sept. 11, 1973, on file in Univ. of Wyo. Law Library.
The following states have either no death penalty or a death penalty
limited to one or two crimes: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Vermont, and
West Virgina, as indicated in Appendix I of Furman, supra note 3 at 2794.
Only Texas responded to Furman with a legislative abolition of capital
punishment. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02 and 12.31 (Vernon 1973).
The statutes of Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, and New York
may all be considered similar to the statutes of Arizona, Utah, and Ohio
in their listings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and their
provisions for a separate sentencing hearing at the trial court level.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-452 to 54 (Supp. 1972-73).
AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E) (Supp. 1972-73).
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Mitigating-(1) "impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness" of the act, even though "not so impaired as to be a
defense to prosecution," (2) commission of the murder "under unusual and substantial duress," though "not so much as
to be a defense to prosecution," (3) "relatively slight" participation as a "principal in the offense committed by
another," (4) it was not reasonably foreseeable that his act
"would create a grave risk of death to another person."
The burden of proof of aggravating circumstances rests
with the state and traditional rules of evidence apply; the
burden of proof of mitigating circumstances rests with the
defendant, and admission of evidence with respect to these is
not governed by traditional rules of evidence. The court must
"return a special verdict setting forth its findings," and it
"shall impose the death sentence if it finds one or more of the
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."
The problems with the Arizona statute are manifold.
Nothing is said about a lesser included offense charge, so
presumably the statute is designed to satisfy Mr. Jutice White.
If so, it fails miserably. Although all discretion has been
taken away from the jury, great discretion remains with the
trial judge, who makes the ultimate determination in the
sentencing hearing. The legislative guidelines in the form of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are impossibly
vague in places. For example, aggravating factors #3 and #6
could probably not be determined without the exercise of a
great deal of discretion. The same can be said of all the listed
mitigating circumstances. The "reasonable foreseeability"
test adopted from tort law in #4 allows total subjectivity on
the part of the trial judge. The trial judge also has great discretion to decide, in a case where mitigating factors exist,
whether these are "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency," a phrase so vague as to hardly merit being called a
legislative standard.
The Utah statute" is more carefully drawn than the Arizona statute, but it has some of the same inherent problems.
73. ARIz.
74. ARIZ.
75. UTAH

REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(F) (Supp. 1972-73).
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-454(B) (Supp. 1972-73).
CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202, 76-3-206 to 207 (Supp.
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Utah has eight aggravating factors, which are listed in its
new definition of capital murder. These are: (1) murder by
a convict, (2) another murder at the same time, (3) knowing
creation of "a great risk of death" to another besides the
victim, (4) felony murder, (5) "murder to avoid arrest or
effect escape," (6) murder for gain, (7) prior murder conviction, (8) "murder of a child under 12 as a result of physical abuse or neglect." 6
Utah provides for a separate sentencing hearing after the
defendant has been found guilty of capital murder, to determine whether the sentence shall be death or life imprisonment. 7 Utah's proceedings, unlike Arizona's, are conducted
before the jury which found the defendant guilty. Utah specifies that "evidence may be presented as to any matter the
court deems relevant to sentence," and rules of admissibility
of evidence do not apply."8 Utah lists five statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) "no significant history of prior criminal activity," (2) "extreme mental or emotional disturbance,"
(3) "extreme duress or domination," (4) impairment of
capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct "as a result of
mental disease, intoxication or influence of drugs," (5) youth,
'
and adds (6) "any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.' 17
After all evidence has been presented, the jury is instructed that the death penalty will be imposed upon a unanimous verdict for death, and that if a unanimous verdict for
death is not reached, a sentence of life imprisonment will be
imposed."0 The Utah Supreme Court may review the death
penalty at the defendant's request, and may set it aside only
"if it finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding.""'
The Utah and Arizona statutes both lack the assurance of
statewide uniformity because they do not provide automatic
review by the state supreme court. The Utah statute, like the
Arizona statute, fails to remove the discretion which the Furman majority called unconstitutional. With the exception
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§
§
§
§
§
§

76-5-202(1)
(Supp. 1973).
76-3-206 (Supp. 1973).
76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
76-3-207(1) (a)
76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
76-3-207(3)
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of #3, Utah's aggravating factors are clearer than Arizona's.
But the mitigating factors are just as obscure. The trial judge
has the discretion to decide what evidence is "relevant" to
the sentence. And the jury is free to exercise its discretion in
determining whether or not any mitigating circumstances
exist, knowing that this determination is one of life or death
for the defendant.
The Utah and Arizona statutes are unlikely to be upheld
by the United States Supreme Court. Their lack of provision
for a lesser included offense charge may not be fatal to Burger and Blackmun, because a finding that mitigating factors
exist (or that there are no aggravating factors) would be, in
essence, a finding that the defendant is guilty of the lesser
included offense of non-capital first degree murder. However, both statutes allow too much room for discretion and
arbitrary enforcement to satisfy Douglas, Stewart, or White.
At best, then, these statutes would receive no more support
than did the statutes struck down in Furman.
Ohio's new capital punishment law 2 is the best version
of the type of statute that establishes a separate sentencing
hearing and provides a statutory listing of mitigating circumstances, as Ohio lays out the procedure to be followed more
thoroughly than the other states do.
Under the Ohio law, aggravated murder consists of premeditated murder or felony murder, 3 and the penalty could
be death, life imprisonment, or one of these plus a fine not to
exceed $25,000.4 If the count does not charge any of the
statutorily listed aggravating circumstances, a life sentence
must be imposed by the trial judge upon a guilty verdict." If
the count does charge any aggravating circumstances, the verdiet must state separately "whether the accused is found
guilty or not guilty of the principal charge, and, if guilty,
whether the offender is guilty or not guilty of each specification." The jury is instructed that a specification must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is not told what penalty
82.
83.
84.
85.

OHIO
OHIO
OHIO
OHIO

REv.
REV.
REV.
REv.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§
§
§
§

2903.01, §§ 2929.02 to .04 (1974).
2903.01 (1974).
2929.02(A) (1974).
2929.03(A) (1974).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss1/11

18

Cobb: Bastard or Legitimate Child of Furman - An Analysis of Wyoming's

1974

COMMENT

227

will result from its findings on any charge or specification."
If the jury renders a verdict of guilty on the charge but not
guilty on the specifications, a life sentence is imposed. If,
however, the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charge
and any aggravating factor, the trial judge must determine
the penalty.8 7
In deciding whether the penalty should be life or death
after a jury verdict of guilty of the crime charged and of an
aggravating factor, the judge considers evidence of a statutorily provided presentence investigation, a psychiatric examination, arguments of counsel relevant to sentence, and other
evidence.8 8 If the court finds that none of the listed mitigating circumstances "is established by a preponderance of the
evidence" it shall impose the death sentence. Otherwise, it
imposes a life sentence.8 9 Ohio specifies that, even if an aggravating circumstance is proved beyond reasonable doubt,
the death penalty is precluded when any mitigating circumstance is established by a preponderance of the evidence.9"
Ohio's aggravating factors are similar to Utah's, with the addition of political assassination." The mitigating factors are:
(1) the victim" induced or facilitated" the offense, (2) duress,
coercion, or strong provocation, (3) psychosis or mental deficiency, though "insufficient to establish the defense of
insanity.""
The Ohio statute has a better chance of success than the
Arizona and Utah statutes. The separate sentencing hearing
and provision for consideration of mitigating factors probably provide enough flexibility to win the support of the Furman dissenters. But the problem is still whether Stewart,
Douglas, or White would support such a statute. Ohio's provision that the jury is not to be told the consequences of their
findings is an attempt to eliminate the possibility of jury discretion and so to get the acceptance of at least one of the three
Furman majority Justices. In reality, however, this may be
86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(B)

87. OHIO REV.
88. OHIO REV.
89. OHIO REV.
90. OHIO REV.
91. OHIO REV.
92. OHIO REV.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§ 2929.03(C)
§ 2929.03(D)
§ 2929.03(F)
§ 2929.04(B)
§ 2929.04(A)
§ 2929.04(B)

(1974).
(1974).
(1974).
(1974).
(1974).
(1974).
(1974).
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mere lip service-most jurors are likely either to know about
the new Ohio statute in advance, or to figure out at the trial
what the consequences of their findings would be. Additionally, Ohio's mitigating factors are not much clearer, if any,
than Utah's and Arizona's, and Ohio's "preponderance of the
evidence" standard set as the burden of proof for these mitigating factors allows the trial judge about as much discretion
as the "reasonable foreseeability" test of Arizona and the
"relevance" test of Utah.
B. The Statute of Oklahoma
Oklahoma's new capital punishment law93 is of a different, and harsher, variety than Arizona's, Utah's, and
Ohio's, in that there is no separate sentencing hearing
and no provision for consideration of mitigating circumstances. Oklahoma enumerates ten capital offenses: (1) murder of a peace officer or fireman in the line of duty, (2) felony
murder (rape, arson, armed robbery, kidnapping, sexual
molestation of a child), (3) victim was to be a witness against
the accused, (4) political assassination, (5) hijack murder,
(6) murder for hire or by procurement, (7) murder by a lifesentence convict, (8) murder of two or more persons "arising
out of the same transaction," (9) murder of a child, (10)
murder by "malicious use of an explosive." 9 4
Oklahoma provides that "[e]very person convicted of
murder in the first degree shall suffer death. [A]nd upon a
finding of guilty (the jury) shall ... state affirmatively in
their verdict that the defendant shall suffer death." 5 It also
specifies that the trial judge may instruct the jury as to lesser
included offenses "if the evidence warrants such instructions." If so, he must put the reasons in writing. 6
No sentencing hearing comparable to those provided by
Arizona, Utah, and Ohio, is found in the Oklahoma statute.
An evidentiary hearing is established on the appellate level,
which allows the Oklahoma criminal court of appeals to determine, after a finding that there were no errors of law, whether
93. Ch.
94. Ch.
95. Ch.
96. Ch.

167,
167,
167,
167,

§§ 1-6, [1973] OKLA. SESS. LAWS 240.
§ 6, [1973] OKLA. SESS. LAWS 240.
§ 3, [1973] OKLA. SEss. LAWS 240.
§ 3, [1973] OKLA. SEss. LAws 240.
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"the sentence of death comports with the principles of due
process and equal protection of the law."" Specifically, the
legislature asks the court to determine:
whether the sentence of death was a res'ult of discrimination based on race, creed, economic condition,
social position, class or sex of the defendant or any
other arbitrary fact; and ... whether the sentence of
death is substantially disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant."
If the court finds the death penalty to be discriminatorily or
arbitrarily imposed, it shall commute the sentence of death
to one of life imprisonment. 9
The Oklahoma capital punishment law merits praise for
its very careful and clever draftsmanship. It has been designed to overcome most of the objections stated by Justices
Stewart and Douglas in Furmnan.' It also provides for a
lesser included offense instruction, the major criteria set by
Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, at the same time
attempting to insure that this instruction cannot be so arbitrarily administered as to make the statute unacceptable to
Douglas and Stewart. And, at least arguably, the appellate
evidentiary hearing provided for by Oldahoma prevents both
"the blind imposition of uniform sentences" which Burger
feared, and the arbitrary enforcement which Douglas feared,
for a proper use of this proceeding would command both f airness and statewide uniformity in the imposition of the death
penalty. If Junker, McDonald, and the Florida committee
97.
98.
99.

Ch. 167, § 5, [1973] OKLA. SESS. LAWS 240.
Ch. 167, § 5, [1973] OKLA. SEss. LAWS 240.
Ch. 167, § 5, [1973] OKLA. SEss. LAWS 240.

100. The only discretion left to the jury is the discretion to convict or acquit,
which is unavoidable, and, if a lesser included offense instruction is given,
the discretion to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense. Although, as
has been pointed out, this latter discretion gives the jury more leeway than
Stewart, Douglas, and White wanted them to have, it is absolutely essential
to the support of Burger and Blackmun. Further, it provides that in each
case in which the judge gives the instruction, he must put in writing why
he gave it based on the evidence. This should prevent arbitrary administration on the part of the trial judge. The only discretion left to the trial
judge by the Oklahoma statute is the discretion whether or not to give the
lesser included offense instruction, and that discretion is narrowly restricted
by the statutory rule that he must put his reasons in writing, and by the
appellate review. The Oklahoma prosecutor has the discretion whether or
not to bring the capital charge, but the statute unambiguously defines
capital murder and, in a close case, the appellate review should correct any
errors.
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legal staff are correct in their assessment of Furmanas spelling the complete end of capital punishment, which they may
well be, then of course, the Oklahoma statute is an "exercise
in futility...... But if there is hope left in a post-Furman
resurrection of a death penalty that is fairly broad in scope,
the Oklahoma statute serves as the most likely model.' °2
IV. WYOMING'S NEW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW
A. The Statute
Wyoming's new § 6-54(a) is identical to the first four
lines of the old § 6-54:
Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or

in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any
rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, or by administering poison or causing the same to be done, kills any
human being, is guilty of murder in the first degree." 8
The words allowing the exercise of jury discretion in the old
statute.. are eliminated in the new statute. The new § 6-54(b)
states:
Upon conviction of murder in the first degree, a
mandatory sentence of death in the manner provided
by law shall be imposed if the trier of fact finds the
offense involves the following course of conduct :"0'
Then follows a list of ten aggravating situations: (1) "murder of any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman
101. See Part II supra.
102. There may be no problem with a statute such as Rhode Island's. R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (1969) provides a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for persons convicted of first degree murder, unless it was
committed by a convict already under sentence of life imprisonment, in
which case there is a mandatory death sentence.
Indiana's new statute, IND. ACTS 1973, Pub. L. No. 328, § 1 (1973), is
somewhat similar to Oklahoma's (no separate sentencing hearing, no consideration of mitigating factors), but it is deficient in that it provides no
uniform and automatic appellate review. It specifically precludes charging
a lesser included offense but specifically allows the trier of fact to convict
of a lesser included offense where the facts are insufficient to convict of
the capital crime charged. The Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission
hopes to eliminate the part of the statute allowing conviction on lesser offenses in 1974. Letter from W. F. Conour, Research Analyst, Ind. Crim.
Law Study Comm'n, to Lynn Cobb, Sept. 21, 1973, on file in Univ. of Wyo.
Law Library.
103. WYO. STAT. § 6-54(a) (Supp. 1973).
104. WYO. STAT. § 6-54 (1957). This added "[B]ut the jury may qualify their
verdict by adding thereto, 'without capital punishment' and whenever the
jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall
be sentenced to imprisonment, at hard labor, for life."
105. WYO. STAT. § 6-54(b) (Supp. 1973).
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acting in the line of duty," (2) murder for hire or by procurement, (3) murder by malicious use of an explosive, (4)
murder after a prior murder conviction, (5) murder by a lifesentence convict, (6) felony murder (The statute lists rape,
arson, robbery, and burglary, but limits capital felony murder
to the situation where the accused has previously been convicted of the specified felony; thus, apparently, a defendant
convicted of robbery-murder with a previous conviction of
rape would not come within this subsection.), (7) kidnap
murder, (8) hijack murder, (9) murder to conceal crime or
identity or to suppress evidence, and (10) multiple murders." 6
A bifurcated trial is provided in the event of a capital
charge under aggravating factors #4, #5, and #6, with "the
determination of prior conviction" made "by the jury after
the jury has returned its verdict of conviction." 0 ' If no aggravating factor is found to exist, the defendant is sentenced
to life imprisonment." 8 Where the death sentence is imposed,
the statute provides for automatic review by the Wyoming
Supreme Court of both "[t]he judgment of conviction and
sentence of death." 0 9
B. Wyoming's Statute-A Comparison
Wyoming's statute is not of the same variety as the statutes of Arizona, Utah, and Ohio, because Wyoming provides
no separate sentencing hearing and no consideration of mitigating factors. Therefore, most of the problems inherent in
those statutes are avoided by Wyoming's § 6-54.
On its face, the Wyoming statute would appear to be of
the same breed as the Oklahoma statute. There is a crucial
difference, however. Whereas Oklahoma enacted a death penalty law that would be suitable to Burger and Blackmun and
yet at the same time one that would not necessarily preclude
the support of Stewart or Douglas, Wyoming ignored the
Burger-Blackmun criteria, and enacted a death penalty law
aimed at the support of Stewart, White, Douglas, Powell,
and Rehnquist.
106.

WYO. STAT. §
107. WYo. STAT. §
108. WYO. STAT. §
109. Wyo. STAT. §

6-54(b) (i-x) (Supp. 1973).
6-54(c) (Supp. 1973).
6-54(e) (Supp. 1973).
6-54(d) (Supp. 1973).
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Wyoming's aggravating circumstances are almost identical to Oklahoma's, although Wyoming does not include assassination (Oklahoma #4) or murder of a child (Oklahoma #9),
and Wyoming's capital felony murder is not as harsh as
Oklahoma's, for the reasons stated above in conjunction with
Wyoming #6.
The automatic review by the Wyoming Supreme Court
provided in the Wyoming statute is not at all similar to the
evidentiary hearing by the Court of Criminal Appeals provided in the Oklahoma statute. Oklahoma sets statutory
guidelines for its appellate evidentiary hearing, but Wyoming
does nothing of the kind for its supreme court review. On
the contrary, Wyoming allows the supreme court discretion
to conduct the review "in accordance with rules promulgated
by the supreme court..... Since the Wyoming statute demands no appellate consideration of whether the death sentence was discriminatorily or arbitrarily imposed, and the
Oklahoma statute does, Wyoming puts the burden of proving
discrimination and arbitrary enforcement on the defendant,
while Oklahoma puts the burden of proving the opposite on
the state.
Unlike the Oklahoma statute, Wyoming's statute is silent
on the subject of a lesser included offense instruction. Presumably, therefore, a capital jury in Wyoming can avoid the
death penalty only by a verdict of acquittal, a feature which
is certain to preclude the support of Burger and Blackmun,
who foresaw this problem and said that it would demand "a
rigidity in capital cases which, if possible of achievment, cannot be regarded as a welcome change."'
C. Should Wyoming § 6-54 Succeed or Fail?
Wyoming § 6-54 must be examined from the point of view
of whether it is likely to be held constitutional by White,
110. WYo. STAT. § 6-54(d) (Supp. 1973).
111. Furman, supra note 3, at 2808 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). If the Wyoming
statute is administered so as to allow a finding of guilt on lesser included
offenses, Burger and Blackmun would probably go along with it. But the
state would have to show that indeed this is its intent, which might be
difficult in the first few cases brought under the statute. Additionally,
Douglas could use this to hold the statute unconstitutional, saying that
since the statute fails to provide standards for a lesser included offense
instruction, it is capable of arbitrary enforcement.
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Douglas, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, the majority obviously sought by the Wyoming legislature in enacting the
statute. As has already been observed (discussion, supra,
Part I, B), it is quite risky to count on the support of Douglas
or Stewart, and even riskier to count on the support of both.
Essentially, what Douglas and Stewart seem to be demanding
in Furman is fairness in the imposition of the death penalty
-they do not want the statute to leave any room, either on
its face or in the way it could conceivably be administered,
for discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement. On the other
hand, White, whose language is somewhat similar to that of
Stewart and Douglas, seems to want more of a pre-established
rigidity, whether this achieves "fairness" or not.
Should Wyoming's new § 6-54 be acceptable to Justice
White? It may be-the Wyoming statute does overcome
most of White's major objections. The Wyoming legislature
has authorized the death penalty for specified crimes. It has,
in fact, commanded that the death penalty be imposed for
these crimes. The legislative enumeration of the crimes provides standards which Wyoming judges and juries must follow in imposing the death penalty, and which considerably
limit the amount of discretion that can be exercised. Further,
§ 6-54 allows very little laxity for infrequency of imposition
within each capital murder classification (with the exception
of #9, which may not be fatal to White but would be to Douglas-see discussion infra) or overall within the legislative
scheme. White should find Wyoming's statute more satisfactory than the statutes of Arizona, Utah, Ohio, or Oklahoma.
Should § 6-54 be acceptable to Stewart and Douglas?
This is a more difficult problem, but the only reasonable answer is that it is extremely improbable that § 6-54 would be
found satisfactory by both Justices. Even assuming that
Douglas and Stewart will not be overly concerned by the remaining presence of such areas of discretion as plea bargaining and executive clemency,' 12 some defects within the statute
itself will work to preclude their support.
112. See Part II supra. This is a legitimate assumption, for it is arguable that
under a mandatory death penalty system, the prosecuting and defense attorneys would have no right to engage in plea negotiations, nor would the
governor be entitled to grant clemency, both of which would violate legislative intent.
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One defect is the standardless discretion granted to the
Wyoming Supreme Court by § 6-54(d). This may be too
much for Douglas and/or Stewart. It would be difficult to
show that this procedure is necessarily conducive to fairness
in the sentencing process, where there are no legislative standards to insure fairness.
The most obvious defect, however, is aggravating factor
#9 (murder to conceal crime or identity or to suppress evidence). This must be seen as a catch-all section, for any murder could, at the discretion of the prosceutor, be charged as
capital murder under this section. A catch-all section is
per se inconsistent with the Furmanmajority's demands that
clear legislative standards be set and excessive jury/judge
discretion be eliminated, as well as with Burger's suggestion
that, at the least, the death penalty should be limited to the
most heinous crimes. The fact that the Wyoming legislature
made a weak effort to disguise the catch-all qualities of #9
by its wording is unlikely to fool Stewart or Douglas, particulary Douglas, who has already vowed to look beyond the wording to the possible application.
A hypothesis will suffice for purposes of an illustration.
A man accosts two girls. He kills one girl and subsequently
robs and rapes the other girl. He then attempts to kill her,
too, but she survives and identifies him. § 6-54 (10) cannot
apply, since one girl lived. Assuming that the man has no
prior felony convictions, neither #4 nor #6 would apply,
leaving the prosecutor with the choice of bringing the capital
charge under #9, or not bringing it at all. But can it be murder to conceal crime when the crime to be concealed has not
yet been committed? Undoubtedly, the prosecutor would bring
the charge under #9. The crime is despicable, and the desire
to bring the capital charge is understandable, but the connection with the wording of #9 is, at best, nebulous and demonstrates that #9 can be used to cover the situations that are not
covered by the other sub-sections. It can easily be seen that,
in addition to giving the prosecutor an inordinate amount of
discretion, #9 also gives the trier of fact great discretion to
decide whether or not a wide variety of situations, of more
or less tenuous connection with the ordinary meaning of the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss1/11
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words, fall within #9. To hope that this would escape the
attention and disapproval of Stewart and Douglas would be
naive.
Without the support of Brennan and Marshall, who have
called the death penalty unconstitutional, without the support of Burger and Blackmun, who want a lesser included
offense instruction, and without the support of Stewart and
Douglas, who want a statute incapable of arbitrary administration, Wyoming § 6-54 cannot succeed.
CONCLUSION
Confusion still dominates the subject of capital punishment, more after Furman than before. Although Justices
Brennan and Marshall for the majority, and Burger and
Blackmun for the dissent, did a commendable job of showing
the states why they should abolish the death penalty, most of
the states chose to ignore their arguments and enact new
death penalty statutes. The reason for this is clear-the states
believe their citizens want the death penalty. At one time, this
was enough to justify any reasonable death penalty statute.
But Furman leaves no doubt that, constitutionally, it will
not be enough in the future.
What will be enough can be surmised but not predicted.
Whether the new death penalty statutes spawned by Furman
are bastards or legitimate children remains to be seen. The
Oklahoma statute has the best chance of success, but even that
can only be called a fair chance, not a good one. The Wyoming
statute is almost certain to fail. The major problems in the
Wyoming statute should be corrected at the earliest opportunity, and § 6-54 should be remodeled after Oklahoma's
capital punishment law. In the meantime, the statute should
be administered by the courts so as to eliminate these problems whenever possible. Lesser included offense intructions
should be given where warranted, and capital charges brought
under #9 should not be accepted unless the facts clearly coincide with the plain meaning of the words.
Above all, Wyoming, as a state and as a people, should
brace itself for the apparently inevitable end of capital punPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1974
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ishment as a feature of our legal system, and start thinking
about acceptable alternatives. The emotional aspects of capital punishment may never satisfactorily be resolved, but the
ultimate issue of controversy is on the threshold of resolution.
And all signs point to the impending death of capital
punishment.
LYNN COBB
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